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What Do We Work For? 
An Anatomy of Pre- and Post-Tax Earnings Growth
* 
 
Promotions and cross-firm mobility provide substantial gains in earnings – a well established 
finding based on gross income data. Yet, what matters for incentives is how much an 
individual can consume or save after taxation. We show that net and gross income growth 
patterns may differ substantially when a progressive tax system allows for deduction 
opportunities. Exploiting unique matched employer-employee data with information on tax 
payments and employee mobility, we find that gross income gains from promotions and 
cross-firm mobility do not translate into significantly higher net income growth, because 
employees adjust their tax-shielded consumption and savings (in particular, deductible 
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Earnings growth and employee mobility are central themes in labor economics. Pay raises
triggered by promotions are a key source of incentives for employees in a range of models in
personnel economics (e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981; see the survey by Gibbons and Waldman
1999a). And, according to models of job search, earnings gains for job switchers are to a
large extent the fruits of employees' eorts to nd more productive employment matches
(e.g., Burdett and Mortensen 1998; Jovanovic 1979). These models are complemented by
a large body of empirical research that analyzes earnings growth. For instance, Topel and
Ward's (1992) inuential study attributes more than one-third of the wage growth of white
men in the U.S. during their rst decade in the labor market to pay increases experienced
when moving to new employers.1 Further, Baker, Gibbs and Holmstr om (1994a, 1994b) and
other studies employing data sets from particular rms or occupations nd that promotions
are important drivers of long-run compensation growth.2 All these empirical studies consider
gross earnings. However, from the employee's perspective, what matters most is the amount
that he or she can actually spend or save. In fact, while employees see the paycheck in their
bank account after tax and social security contributions have been deducted, they may not
even know what their exact gross salary is.3
How much does the distinction between gross and net earnings matter? One might expect
that a progressive tax schedule simply attenuates after-tax income growth rates relative to
pre-tax income growth rates. As gross income is taxed at an increasing rate, a larger and
larger share is eaten up by taxes, therefore dampening the growth of after-tax income.
However, matters are not that simple. The trivial correspondence between the two growth
rates does not hold because income tax systems oer deduction opportunities that allow
employees to shield some of the fruits of higher gross income growth from contemporaneous
taxation. These deductions can be quite substantial, in particular in countries that allow
deductions for voluntary pension contributions or mortgage interest payments.
In this paper, we provide an empirical assessment of how progressive taxation and deduc-
tion opportunities aect the relationship between employee mobility and earnings growth.
Exploiting a unique data set that merges Danish tax records with a linked employer-employee
panel, we show that very dierent qualitative results obtain if one uses net rather than gross
1Other contributions on the importance of job mobility for wage growth are, e.g., Antel (1986, 1991),
Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Altonji and Williams (2005), Bartel and Borjas (1981), Buchinsky et al. (2010),
Dustmann and Meghir (2005), Keith and McWilliams (1999), Mincer (1986), and Topel (1991).
2For example, Belzil and Bognanno (2008), Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2003), Chiappori, Salanie and
Valentin (1999), Dohmen et al. (2004), Gibbs and Hendricks (2004), Lazear (1992), Medo and Abraham
(1980, 1981), Seltzer and Merrett (2000) and Treble et al. (2001).
3An indication of this is that in surveys, people have been found to report biased estimates of the income
taxes they pay (e.g., Enrick 1964; Van Wagsta 1965).
2income data. While both promotions and cross-rm mobility have a sizeable impact on pre-
tax labor income growth, these eects largely disappear once one considers income growth
after taxes. This nding is a consequence of the tax system, which encourages individuals
to contribute part of their gross income to private pension funds and encourages nancial
decisions that increase tax deductible interest.
Detailed information on deductions allows us to establish that tax-shielded consumption
and savings opportunities are important elements in individuals' planning. When employees
exert eort to earn a promotion or to nd a better employment match, the fruits of this
labor are enjoyed via tax-shielded consumption and savings for retirement (such as enjoying
a nicer, more expensive home nanced through a mortgage; using credit to drive a better car;
or increasing pension contributions to look forward to higher income in old age). This allows
individuals to circumvent the progressivity of the tax system. Net income growth data do
not reect these opportunities, however. Our ndings thus suggest that, in the absence of
detailed knowledge of tax deductions, gross earnings growth provides a better sense of the
incentives for labor market eort than net income growth.
We estimate a dynamic panel data model that treats income as an ARMA process with
a unit root, an empirical strategy consistent with previous work on income dynamics (e.g.,
Abowd and Card 1989; Meghir and Pistaferri 2004; Topel and Ward 1992). Our data
come from two dierent registers collected by Statistics Denmark: the tax register and the
employer-employee panel known as IDA.4 The tax register contains all relevant information
on income, deductions, and taxes paid by the entire Danish population. This provides us
with various income measures needed to calculate taxes, which in turn reveal tax-shielded
consumption and savings opportunities and allow us to construct a measure of net income.
Two important features of these data are that they match individuals to companies on a
yearly basis and that they provide a measure of hierarchical placement. The two data sets
can be merged because we have unique person and establishment identiers, which allows
us to track employees both within and across companies and, thus, to estimate the eects
of mobility on relevant income measures.
Our ndings are of broad interest because some structural features of Denmark's labor
market and taxation system resemble those in the U.K. and the U.S.. For instance, Denmark
is more similar to the U.K. and the U.S. in terms of labor market exibility and rates
of cross-rm mobility than are countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the
Netherlands (see, e.g., Jolivet et al. 2006). In addition, the costs of laying o workers are
low on account of liberal labor market policies (e.g., absence of severance pay legislation
and lack of experience rating in the unemployment insurance system) and there is weak
4For other studies on employee mobility using IDA data, see, e.g., Aagard et al. (2009), Bagger et al.
(2009), Frederiksen, Honor e and Hu (2007), Frederiksen (2008), and our companion paper, Frederiksen,
Halliday and Koch (2010). For studies applying the tax register data see, e.g., Browning and Leth-Petersen
(2003). We are aware of a single study that combines the two data sources: Chetty et al. (2010).
3job security (albeit with generous unemployment benets). Like most income tax systems,
Denmark has a progressive tax schedule. While overall tax rates are relatively high by
international standards, structurally, the tax system resembles those of other industrialized
countries because contributions to private pension plans and mortgage interest payments are
tax deductible.5
To our knowledge, we are the rst to link the impact of promotions and employee mobility
on earnings growth to taxation. As such, we contribute to studies that investigate the eects
of income taxes on individual behavior (for a recent survey, see Kniesner and Ziliak 2008).
In particular, because we emphasize incentives for eort and mobility that lead to higher
earnings without necessarily increasing hours worked, our paper is related to studies that
estimate the elasticity of taxable income (e.g., Feldstein 1995; Gruber and Saez 2002; for a
survey, see Saez, Slemrod and Giertz 2010).
Our main contribution is to the personnel economics and income dynamics literatures.
The innovation of this paper is to show the consequences of mobility on both gross and net
income, as well as on deductions. Thereby, we provide a more detailed picture of factors
that motivate labor market eort and mobility than was possible in previous studies. Fur-
thermore, we add to the limited number of studies that use a single data set to investigate
job mobility both within and across rm boundaries. Among these are McCue (1996), who
uses the PSID, Dias da Silva and Van der Klaauw (2010), who use Portuguese matched
employer-employee data (Quadros de Pessoal), and our companion paper, Frederiksen et al.
(2010), that also uses the IDA data.
The paper is organized as follows. We provide an illustration of the theoretical driving
forces behind growth in gross and net income income in Section 2. A description of our data
follows in Section 3, and we lay out the econometric strategy in Section 4. Section 5 presents
our estimation results, and Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of our ndings.
2 Gross vs. Net Income Growth: The Driving Forces
How does growth in after-tax income dier from growth in pre-tax income? At rst, one
might expect that a progressive tax system simply attenuates net income growth relative
to gross income growth. To capture this intuition more formally, note that taxes can be
5Tax-deductibility of contributions to private pension plans is very common. For an overview of practices
in OECD countries see, e.g., Table 1 in Caminada and Goudswaard (2008). Tax relief for mortgage interest
is allowed in several countries, including the Netherlands, the U.K. and the U.S. In the Netherlands, interest
can be deducted over a maximum period of 30 years (see http://www.belastingdienst.nl/variabel/
buitenland/en/private_taxpayers/private_taxpayers-12.html). In the U.K., mortgage interest relief
was phased out for new loans in April 2000 (see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/mir/intro.pdf). The
U.S. provisions allow interest deductions on debt of up to $1 million under 26 U.S.C. x163(h) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
4written as gross income Ct times the individual's average tax rate t. So, net income is
simply Cnet
t = Ct (1 t), and net income growth is related to gross income growth as follows











Because average tax rates increase with gross income in a progressive tax schedule, the
second factor in equation (1) will be less than one. In other words, net income grows more
slowly than gross income.
This argument, however, only partially captures the inuence of taxes on income growth.
Because the tax system allows for deductions, there is a second eect: deductions from
gross income lead to a lower taxable base, which in turn, leads to lower taxes. So if the
taxable base grows at a slower speed than gross income, then the net income growth rate
may actually exceed that of gross income. To see the driving forces more clearly, suppose
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After accounting for deductions, net income growth depends on both the evolution of the
average tax rate and deductions. Net income grows faster than gross income if the taxable
base increases more slowly than the average tax rate (because of increases in the portion of
earnings that are deducted for tax purposes). The bottom line is that there is no simple
relation between gross and net income growth.
3 The Data
Our study merges tax records with register-based information on all establishments and resi-
dents in Denmark from Statistics Denmark's Integrated Database for Labor Market Research
(IDA).6 We focus on male core private-sector employees with stable labor force attachment,
and restrict the age range so that education and retirement choices play no signicant role.
That is, our sample includes all male employees in Denmark who were continuously in full-
time employment between 1994 and 2005 in private sector establishments with at least 25
employees, and who were aged between 30 and 45 years at the start of the panel in 1994.7
6The Danish name for the database is Integreret Database for Arbejdsmarkedsforskning (IDA). It is
documented at http://www.dst.dk/TilSalg/Forskningsservice/Databaser/IDA.aspx.
7While we know employment status from social security records on a monthly basis, employer-employee
matches are recorded only once a year in November. So shorter employment periods (and associated ows),
5Table 1: Descriptive statistics (at start of panel in 1994)
Agea 37.63
(4.53)
9 years (less than high school) 18.26%
12 years (high school) 56.19%
15 years (Bachelor's degree or professional degree) 18.55%
17 years (Master's degree) 7.00%
Firm sizea (number of employees, employee weighted average) 2,259
(3,524)
Unique individuals 58,860
Person-year observations (1994 - 2005) 706,320
Notes: Panel of men aged 30 to 45 in 1994, continuously employed between 1994 and 2005
in private sector rms with at least 25 employees. a Mean (standard deviation).
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics. The sample contains a balanced panel of
58,860 unique individuals, who each have an 11-year employment history, resulting in 706,320
person-year observations. At the start of our panel, the average person is 38 years old, works
in a rm with 2,559 employees, and has completed high school.
3.1 Income Measures
The tax records provide detailed information on various income measures important for
calculating tax payments, actual taxes paid and deductions. We can explain the actual tax
payments for more than 95 percent of the population with an accuracy of  DKK 5 (less
than $ 1). To illustrate how our data permit us to distinguish the eects of tax deductions
from those of progressive tax rates, a brief overview of the main features in the Danish
income tax code is required (Appendix A provides more details). Two major categories of
tax deductions prove to be important: voluntary contributions to private pension plans and
deductions for interest on debt (where substantial deductions typically stem from mortgage
interest and interest on car loans).8
Denmark has a progressive income tax schedule with essentially four tax brackets (illus-
trated in Figure 1 in Appendix A). The rst tax bracket is a social security payroll tax of
around 9 percent applied to labor income. In a subsequent step, the tax authorities compute
for instance lasting from March to September of a particular year, cannot be picked up with our data. Given
our focus on core employees with continuous employment histories, however, this does not seem problematic
for our purposes.
8Cars in Denmark are extremely expensive. In addition to VAT at the time of import into the country
they are subject to a special registration tax of 105 percent on the Danish market value of the car up to DKK
79,000 (around $ 9,000) and of 180 percent on the value of the car exceeding that threshold (2010 rates;
thresholds are occasionally adjusted for ination see http://www.skat.dk/SKAT.aspx?oId=63&vId=0).
6Table 2: Overview of income measures and deduction opportunities
Labor income (annual base pay and variable pay components)
- Payroll tax
- Deductions (voluntary contributions to pension funds)
= Personal income
- Deductions (commuting costs, union dues, and unemployment insurance contributions)
+ Capital income
Earned interest (e.g., savings accounts and bonds)
- Interest payments (major categories: interest on mortgages and car loans)
= Taxable income
Net income = labor income + capital income - taxes paid
two income measures that enter the tax bases for additional tax payments: personal income
and taxable income. The relations between the various measures are summarized in Table 2,
and Table 3 contains the sample means and standard deviations in 2000 { the year for which
we illustrate the tax code in Appendix A. In our empirical analysis we adjust all income
measures to year-2000 prices using Statistics Denmark's consumer price index.
Personal income is dened as labor income net of the payroll tax and net of voluntary
contributions to private pension funds (up to the maximum deduction of DKK 35,200 in
2000). Average personal income is DKK 350,022 in 2000 (corresponding to $ 28,575), as
compared to average gross labor income of DKK 387,655, thus reecting average deductions
of DKK 2,744 (we rst subtract the payroll tax of 9 percent).
Taxable income is dened as personal income plus capital income (and allows for deduc-
tions over which the individual has little discretion, such as commuting costs, or which are
relatively minor, such as union membership fees). Capital income includes interest earned
on savings accounts or bonds (dividends and capital gains on stocks are taxed separately)
and is reduced by the amount of interest paid on debt. Hence, tax relief for interest on mort-
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for income measures (in 2000)
Labor income 387,655 Personal income 350,022
(183,524) (182,517)




Notes: Mean (standard deviation) Danish kroner; DKK 100 = $ 8.
For income denitions see Table 2.
7gages or car loans enters at this stage. Importantly, almost all individuals hold signicant
amounts of debt. Specically, capital income is negative for more than 93 percent of our
sample in 1994; and 11 years later, more than 88 percent still have negative capital income.
The average taxable income of DKK 299,627 reects total downward adjustments of DKK
50,395, of which DKK 33,024 are due to negative capital income.9
3.2 Promotions and Cross-Firm Mobility
Unique identiers in the IDA data allow us to map cross-rm moves by following individu-
als and establishments over time (matches between employees and employers are recorded
once a year in November). Further, the data provide a measure of hierarchical placement
based on the rst digit of the Danish International Standard Classication of Occupations
(DISCO) codes. We distinguish \executives" { employees who manage organizations or de-
partments (major group 1, comprising corporate managers and general managers) { from
\non-executives" (subsuming all other major groups).10 Our hierarchical placement variable
has two advantages. First, it has a consistent interpretation across the wide spectrum of
rms covered by our data, helping to avoid some of the problems caused by promotion mea-
sures based on organizational charts and self-reports from employees or employers, whose
rm- or industry-specic nature complicates comparisons.11 Second, our variable provides a
clean measure of an employee's promotion that involves an actual change in position. Such
a shift in the employee's production technology is central to prominent theoretical models of
wage and promotion dynamics (e.g., Bernhardt 1995, Gibbons and Waldman 1999, 2006).12
While most employees remain with their current employer, every year around 11 percent
of the sample switch employers. We also observe that about 1.5 percent of the non-executives
are promoted every year. The combination of cross-rm mobility and within-rm moves
results in eight dierent types of ows accounted for by our estimation: non-executives
staying with their current employer, moving to a new employer, or promoted within-rm or
9Broken down by age categories, average capital income (standard deviation) for employees less than or
equal to 40 is DKK -34,314 (28,060), DKK -33,914 (41,431) for those aged 40-45, and DKK -31,261 (39,775)
for those above 45.
10The DISCO codes follow the international denitions from the International Labor Organization (ILO),
documented at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/.
11A change in hierarchical level according to the classication is often not perceived as such by members
of the organization. For example, 70 percent of all moves classied as a promotion are not considered to be
a promotion by the employer in the Portuguese matched employer-employee data Quadros de Pessoal used
by Dias da Silva and Van der Klaauw (2010).
12Often it is hard to distinguish \promotions" that involve no position change from other elements of
pay-for-performance. For example, 40-50 percent of self- or employer-reported promotions involve no change
in job description in Dias da Silva and Van der Klaauw (2010), who use employer-reported promotions in
the Quadros de Pessoal, and in Pergamit and Veum (1999), who exploit questions about promotion receipt
in the 1990 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.
8Table 4: The autocovariances of income growth
Autocovariance (bootstrapped std. errora)
Order 0 1 2 3 4
Gross labor income 0.01892 -0.00575 -0.00117 0.00001 -0.00004
(0.00217) (0.00108) (0.00048) (0.00010) (0.00008)
Personal income 0.13483 -0.06144 -0.00168 -0.00141 0.00013
(0.00730) (0.00379) (0.00166) (0.00128) (0.00112)
Taxable income 0.18702 -0.07817 -0.00376 -0.00195 -0.00009
(0.00923) (0.00477) (0.00197) (0.00149) (0.00135)
Net income 0.21901 -0.08377 -0.00582 -0.00335 0.00132
(0.00831) (0.00458) (0.00197) (0.00154) (0.00259)
Notes: All income measures are in year-2000 prices. For denitions see Table 2. a 100 replications.
Signicance levels: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
while moving to a new rm; executives staying with their current employer, moving to a
new employer, or demoted to a non-executive position within the same rm or at a new rm
(Appendix B provides detailed ow statistics).
4 The Econometric Strategy
For a given earnings measure Ci;t for individual i at date t, we model log earnings growth as
ln(Ci;t)  ln(Ci;t)   ln(Ci;t 1) = i +
J X
j=1
j Mj;i;t + X
0
i;t  + ui;t; (4)
ui;t = i;t + "i;t:
The right-hand side of equation (4) consists of a xed-eect (i), J mobility dummies Mj;i;t,
a vector of control variables (Xi;t), and a residual (ui;t). The mobility dummies correspond
to the ows presented above, using as reference category non-executive employees staying
at that level within the same rm. Our control variables include a quadratic in age, as
well as education, sector, and year xed-eects. The residual contains an iid permanent
income shock (i;t) and a transitory shock ("i;t) that follows an MA(q) process. Studies
of individual earnings dynamics typically nd that q is of low order (e.g., Abowd and Card
1989; Meghir and Pistaferri 2004).
The rst step is to determine if there is a xed-eect in earnings growth (i.e., V ar(i) >
0). This is done using a procedure common in the earnings dynamics literature that tests
for signicance of the autocorrelations of earnings growth (see, e.g., Abowd and Card 1989;
Meghir and Pistaferri 2004). In the presence of a xed-eect, autocorrelations should be
positive and signicant at all leads and lags. Table 4 reports autocovariances along with
9their bootstrapped standard errors for the four income measures that we use in our empirical
analysis. Autocorrelations die out after a few lags, providing evidence against a xed-eect
in earnings growth. We therefore assume that V ar(i) = 0.13
The model in equation (4) is purged of serial correlation in the residual by projecting












j Mj;i;t + X
0
i;t  + ei;t; (5)
where ei;t  i;t + i;t. The parameters s reect the correlation between lagged earnings
growth and transitory earnings shocks.14 A Cochrane-Orcutt test can determine whether
the included lags are sucient to eliminate serial correlation in the ei;t. In our data we nd
that there is no signicant serial correlation in ei;t for any of the income measures if three
lags are included (Table 5 reports Cochrane-Orcutt tests for our regressions).
We assume that mobility is predetermined by imposing the following moment conditions
E [ei;t Mj;i;s] = 0 for t  s and for all j: (6)
That is, the residual in equation (5) at time t is assumed to be orthogonal to all mobility
dated t and prior, implying that the permanent income innovation embedded in ei;t can
aect mobility at t + 1 and beyond. The moment conditions restrict the serial correlation
in ei;t (see Arellano and Honor e 2001). As discussed above, one can thus remove the serial
correlation stemming from the transitory shocks in model (4) and obtain consistent estimates
by including a sucient number of lags of earnings growth, as is done in equation (5).
With our econometric treatment of mobility, we follow important previous contributions
in this literature (e.g., Topel and Ward 1992). While our procedure does control for un-
observed individual heterogeneity, the predeterminedness assumption is not innocuous. It
is, however, the best assumption we can invoke because we do not have valid and strong
instruments at hand for all eight types of mobility and all income measures considered herein.
13While the assumption that V ar(1) = 0 and the moment conditions (6) imply that equation (5) can
be estimated using OLS, the analysis of gross earnings data in our companion paper, Frederiksen et al.
(2010), investigates the robustness of this approach using a GMM procedure  a la Arellano and Bond (1991)
to estimate a model that allows for a xed-eect in earnings growth.
14Note that the permanent shock, i;t, will be uncorrelated with the lagged mobility variables embedded
in lagged earnings growth because of the moment conditions (6) that we impose below.
105 Mobility and Income Growth
We now investigate the impact of mobility and hierarchical transitions on gross and net
income growth. After that, we exploit the additional income categories in our data to
determine the extent to which the dierences in growth rates between the gross and net
income measures are due to progressive taxation or to the use of tax deductions.
5.1 Gross Versus Net Income
Starting with pre-tax labor income, the rst column of Table 5 shows that lagged income
growth has a negative eect on current growth, which is in line with previous studies on
income growth (e.g., Abowd and Card 1989; Belzil and Bognanno 2008; Meghir and Pistaferri
2004; Topel and Ward 1992). Promotions and lateral mobility provide a signicant boost to
labor income growth and executives experience higher income growth than non-executives.
This nding is consistent with learning models where assignment to a higher-level job entails
a steeper income growth path (e.g., Gibbons and Waldman 1999, 2006). Demotions, on
the other hand, have no signicant impact on growth relative to the baseline growth of a
non-executive stayer. This reveals an asymmetry between the eect of a promotion and
a demotion on wage growth, similar to what Belzil and Bognanno (2008) nd. For our
purposes, these results serve as comparison point with the estimates for the other income
measures (see our companion paper, Frederiksen et al. (2010), for a more extensive discussion
and further analysis of mobility and gross labor income growth).
Net income captures the amount that an employee has available for consumption and
saving after taxes (net income = labor income + capital income - taxes paid). Comparing
the rst and the last columns of Table 5, we see that only executive stayers are on a steeper
trajectory for net income growth and that non-executives who make lateral moves across
rms witness lower net income growth. All other mobility and promotion eects are no longer
signicant. While net income levels dier for those who get promoted or switch employers
and those who do not, the regressions show that such career moves do not generally accelerate
the rate at which people can consume or save net income. Our nding that changes in gross
income growth do not translate to proportionate changes in net income growth contradicts
the simple explanation that progressive tax rates attenuate after-tax income growth, while
leaving the qualitative eects of mobility and promotions unchanged. Indeed, in the next
step of our analysis, we show how individuals adjust their deductions in a way that results
in almost constant after-tax income growth.
5.2 Tax Deductions and Net Income
The discrepancy between growth rates of labor income and net income reects the compound
eects of deductions and the progressivity of the tax schedule. We separate these eects
11Table 5: Growth of tax-related components of income
Labor Personal Taxable Net
income income income income
Labor income growth (t-1) -0.400 -0.597 -0.554 -0.583
(0.028) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016)
Labor income growth (t-2) -0.249 -0.347 -0.302 -0.352
(0.029) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015)
Labor income growth (t-3) -0.105 -0.174 -0.144 -0.184
(0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Non-executive lateral move, within-rm { { { {
Non-executive lateral move, cross-rm 0.008 0.013 0.015 -0.011
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Promotion, within-rm 0.017 0.020 0.023 0.007
(0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010)
Promotion, cross-rm 0.066 0.084 0.099 -0.017
(0.007) (0.015) (0.016) (0.037)
Executive stayer 0.013 0.019 0.022 0.007
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Executive lateral move, cross-rm 0.041 0.056 0.057 -0.029
(0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.020)
Demotion, within-rm 0.003 0.013 0.014 0.012
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012)
Demotion, cross-rm 0.006 0.025 0.020 -0.046
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.038)
Age/10 -0.065 -0.057 0.004 -0.026
(0.007) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020)
Age2/100 0.005 0.003 -0.003 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
constant 0.224 0.207 0.089 0.177
(0.017) (0.033) (0.037) (0.043)
R2 0.1441 0.3066 0.2798 0.2346
Observations 470,880 470,880 470,880 470,880
Cochran-Orcutt test (H0: zero autocorrelation in errors)
-0.004 0.041 0.048 -0.022
(p-value) (0.933) (0.131) (0.038) (0.240)
Dependent variable: Change in log real income measure ln(It)   ln(It 1).
Notes: All regressions include education, sector, and year dummies. Clustered standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Signicance levels: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
12through comparisons of the intermediate income measures in our data.
Personal income is the rst important tax base to consider. If personal income grows, then
tax payments grow. The second column in Table 5 shows that the coecients on mobility
and hierarchical transitions increase relative to those for labor income. In particular, for the
two categories of lateral cross-rm moves and for executive stayers, the coecients increase
by more than 2 standard deviations. This implies that increases in gross income growth
following a career move are not always matched with a commensurate boost to deductions
for pension fund contributions. To see this, recall from Section 2 that dierences in growth
rates between two income measures depend on how the average tax rate changes and how
deductions evolve. Because the payroll tax is a proportional tax, the average tax rate,
however, does not change with income levels. Thus, the dierent speeds at which labor and
personal income grow are driven by deductions (contributions to private pension plans).15
Consequently, higher growth in personal income means that deductions must have grown at
a slower pace than labor income.
The simple explanation for why deductions grow at a lower rate than net income is that
there is a cap on tax deductible private pension contributions. A slowdown in deductions
growth means that the tax base personal income and, hence, the (progressive) taxes com-
puted from personal income, grow faster than gross income. This depresses net income
growth above and beyond the eect of progressive taxation (see equation (2)) and may even
completely nullify or reverse the trend in gross income growth.
The next step is to compare growth rates of personal income and taxable income. The
comparison reveals how interest payments on debt evolve, because there is little discretion
over other deductions at this stage. No limits apply for tax relief on interest, and the
fact that almost all individuals have negative capital income (see Section 3) facilitates the
interpretation. If a person uses a share  of personal income (PI) to make interest payments









The second and third columns in Table 5 reveal that coecients for mobility and hierarchical
transitions do not move much (considering the size of the standard errors), suggesting that
 remains more or less constant over time. That is, people appear to adjust their debt so
that interest payments move in parallel with their growth in labor income.16
15To see the relation with equation (3), denote deductions by Dt and rewrite personal income as PIt =
(1 payroll)LIt  Dt. Note that deductions out of labor income after payroll taxes, D0 = Dt=(1 payroll),
grow at the same rate as Dt because of the constant payroll tax rate payroll. One can then apply (3) to the
proportion of income after payroll taxes deducted, d0
t.
16Remember that personal income captures other deduction opportunities that explain the discrepancy
between taxable income and labor income coecients. Or, put dierently, if personal income grew in lock-
step with gross income, our results would suggest that taxable income and labor income exhibit the same
13This is actually less surprising than it may rst appear. Mortgage contracts in Denmark
have a standard format that states repayments in terms of both gross and net income, making
it easier to plan net income growth. The majority of mortgages are securitized and there
is a relatively liquid market for these types of securities, resulting in low transaction costs
and allowing for relatively easy restructuring of interest schedules. The ubiquitous summer
houses in Denmark and nanced car purchases provide other opportunities for signicant
debt-nanced consumption. A further indication that net income growth is \managed"
through adjustments in debt comes from the fact that age ceases to be signicant in the
third and fourth columns in Table 5.
In sum, while interest payments on nanced consumption are proportional to gross income
progression, this is not the case for private pension contributions. The latter nding is the
consequence of a policy that places a cap on pension deductions. One implication of this is
that personal income { a tax base { increases faster than gross labor income and thus results
in relatively higher tax payments. In turn, this has the consequence that net income grows
at a slower rate than would be expected if the only dierence between gross labor income
and net income growth was the attenuation eect of a progressive tax schedule.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
In our data, advancing to a management position and cross-rm mobility increase real in-
come growth before taxes. One could have expected these eects to manifest themselves in
net income as well, just attenuated on account of the progressive tax schedule. Instead, we
nd that, while executives are on a signicantly steeper net income growth path than non-
executives, career events such as promotions and cross-rm moves do not lead to a signicant
increase in short-run net income growth. It appears that people exploit deduction opportu-
nities for pension fund contributions and tax relief on debt interest payments to maintain
relatively constant growth in real net income. This points to links between labor market
mobility and certain types of nancial decisions that are interesting for future research.
The fact that promotions and cross-rm moves have no signicant positive impact on
net income growth suggests that employees do not enjoy their fruits in the form of general
consumption. Instead, the additional income growth ows into mortgage-nanced housing,
other forms of debt, and tax-shielded long-term savings (via pension contributions, to the
extent allowed by contribution limits). The benets of career progression and mobility thus
seem to be that they allow for tax-shielded credit that is used to live in a nicer, more
expensive home, to drive a better car, to have a summer cottage, or to increase tax-shielded
pension contributions that increase income in old age. Perhaps what also matters is that
tax-shields can be exploited to nance particularly conspicuous forms of consumption such
growth rates even after a promotion or cross-rm mobility.
14as cars and housing (e.g., Veblen 1899; Frank 1985, 2000).
Overall, our results show that the distinction between gross and net income does matter
for the eects of mobility and promotions on income growth patterns. The reason is that net
income does not reect tax-shielded consumption and savings opportunities made possible
by increases in gross income. Our ndings suggest that, in the absence of detailed knowledge
of tax deductions, results based on gross income growth provide a more accurate qualitative
picture than those based on net income growth. This is good news in view of the fact that
the empirical literature on income dynamics and the eects of mobility and promotions relies
on gross income data for lack of good net income measures.
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Notes: Illustration based on the assumption that the person lives in a municipality with \average" tax rates,
and that he does not have any capital income or other income, and no deductions.
Figure 1: Income tax schedule for 2000.
A A Primer on Income Taxation in Denmark
All wage income is subject to a gross tax (8 percent in 2000), which is comparable to the social
security contributions known in other countries.17 An additional 1 percent of labor income
is paid into a mandatory pension fund. The gross tax and mandatory pension contribution
can be thought of as a 9 percent payroll tax, which marks the rst tier in the Danish income
taxation system.
Deductions enter at dierent stages in the process of calculating tax payments. This
makes it possible to measure separately the impact on earnings growth of the two - for our
purposes - most important deduction opportunities: voluntary contributions to private pen-
sion plans and debt interest relief. The former is reected in personal income, dened as labor
17We use the year-2000 tax code to explain the various income measures, tax rates, and income thresholds,
abstracting from changes in the tax code over our sample period. Income thresholds are adjusted annually
to account for ination. Taking into account changes in the tax code and regional dierences in rates etc.,
we can reconstruct tax payments for more than 95 percent of the population with an accuracy of  DKK 5
(less than $ 1).
16income net of the 9 percent payroll tax and net of deductions for voluntary contributions to
private pension funds (up to a maximum threshold of DKK 35,200). The latter is reected in
taxable income. This income measure is dened as personal income plus capital income net
of deductions. Among the deduction opportunities at this stage (ligningsmssigefradrag)
the principal ones are commuting costs, union membership fees and contributions to an un-
employment insurance fund.18 Capital income includes interest earned on savings accounts
or bonds and allows for deduction of interest paid on debt (dividends and capital gains on
stocks are taxed separately). Interest payments on debt reduce capital income and thereby
lower taxable income. That is, tax relief on mortgage interest enters at this stage.
Taxable and personal incomes serve as bases for four dierent tax components. The rst
comprises local and church taxes: any amount of positive taxable income above a standard
allowance (the personal deduction of DKK 33,400) is subject to municipal and regional
taxes (32.8 percent for the average municipality). For members of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Denmark (Folkekirken) { around 83 percent of the Danish population in 2000
{ the tax rate is increased by around one percentage point. The second is the bottom-
bracket tax, calculated by applying a rate of 7 percent to a tax base consisting of personal
income plus positive net capital income, minus half of any negative net capital income,
minus deductions. The third component is the middle-bracket tax of 6 percent. The base
for this tax is personal income plus any amount of positive capital income that exceeds the
threshold of DKK 164,300. The fourth component is the top-bracket tax. The base for this
tax is personal income, plus positive capital income, plus voluntary contributions to private
pension funds. Only the part of this base that exceeds a threshold of DKK 267,600 is subject
to the top-tax rate of 15 percent.
A complication in the Danish tax system is the so-called tax ceiling. If the municipality
and regional tax rates are suciently high so that they together with the sum of the bottom-,
middle- and top-tax rates exceed the tax ceiling of 59 percent, then the top-tax rate is capped
so that the sum of the tax rates is 59 percent. In practice, this implies that the eective
top-tax in almost half of the municipalities is below 15 percent. A second detail is that the
Danish tax system is primarily an individualized tax system, which facilitates our exercise.
There is only a quantitatively very moderate component of joint taxation because unused
deductions can be transferred to a spouse.
To summarize, the above tax components result in a schedule with essentially four tax
brackets. Figure 1 plots this tax schedule for the 2000-tax code, making it directly compa-
rable with our real income measure that uses 2000 as base year. The gure assumes that
the person lives in a municipality with "average" tax rates, and that the individual has no
positive or negative capital income, and no deductions.
18Unemployment insurance is voluntary in Denmark.
17Table 6: Mobility patterns





Non-executive level 92.73 100
Non-executivet 1 ! Non-executivet
no move 80.94 87.28
lateral move, cross-rm 10.43 11.25
Non-executivet 1 ! Executivet
promotion, within-rm 1.12 1.20
promotion, cross-rm 0.25 0.27
Management 7.27 100
Managementt 1 ! Managementt
no move 5.65 77.72
lateral move, cross-rm 0.56 7.72
Executivet 1 ! Non-executivet
demotion, within-rm 0.86 11.78
demotion, cross-rm 0.20 2.78
Notes: 647,460 person-year observations 1995-2005 (58,860 unique individuals).
B Hierarchical and Cross-Firm Transitions
The combination of cross-rm mobility and within-rm moves results in the eight dier-
ent types of ows summarized in Table 6. While most employees stay with their current
employer, every year around 11 percent of the sample move to a new company. The non-
executive layer comprises around 93 percent of all employees. The bulk of them remain
non-executives and stay with the same employer as in the last year (87 percent) and 11 per-
cent move laterally across rms. A bit more than 1 percent are promoted to a management
position within the same rm, and promotions across rm boundaries account for around
0.3 percent of the non-executives. Similarly, executives (who make up around 7 percent of
the sample) typically remain in management positions, but there is less persistence than for
non-executives. That is, 78 percent stay with their current employer and 8 percent move to
an executive-level position in a new rm. Almost 12 percent of executives move to a non-
executive level job within the same rm, and slightly less than 3 percent of the executives
make such a move across rm boundaries. Our data thus add to a number of studies which
show that demotions are by no means exceptional (see Frederiksen et al. (2010) for further
discussion of this issue).
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